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An artifact of law:  
U.s. prohibition of  
retail hedge funds
1 This article is based in part on research published in Shadab, H., 2008 “Fending for 
themselves: creating a U.S. hedge fund market for retail investors,” 11, New York 
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 251. The author would like to thank 
Massimiliano Trovato for his invaluable research assistance. All errors belong to the 
author alone.
Abstract
The U.S. hedge fund market is one of the largest and most sophis-
ticated hedge fund markets in the world, yet due to U.S. securities 
regulation it is also one of the least accessible. In the U.S., fed-
eral securities law requires individuals to be wealthy to qualify to 
invest in hedge funds. Nonwealthy individuals, or retail investors, 
are effectively prohibited from purchasing hedge fund securities. 
Wealth-based qualifications are meant to ensure that those invest-
ing in hedge funds possess enough financial sophistication to make 
informed investment decisions. However, the application of wealth-
based qualifications to hedge fund investors is more an artifact of 
the specific regulatory framework under which the funds operate 
than a reflection of any fundamentally unique economic charac-
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teristics of the funds. Hedge funds possess risk and disclosure 
characteristics comparable to a wide range of investment oppor-
tunities that U.S. retail investors are currently permitted to invest 
in and also typically make disclosures sufficient for retail investors 
to make informed investment decisions. Limiting hedge funds only 
to the wealthy prevents financially sophisticated yet nonwealthy 
investors from using the funds to minimize losses and maximize 
the risk-adjusted returns of their investment portfolios. To more 
fully advance the regulatory goals of investor protection and capital 
formation, U.S. financial regulators should therefore enact reforms 
to permit retail investors to invest in hedge funds.
Alternatives
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U.S. law makes a clear distinction between wealthy investors (which 
includes high net worth individuals and highly capitalized institu-
tions) and ordinary individuals, who are often referred to as retail 
investors. This distinction is manifested in a dichotomy in the U.S. 
hedge fund market. On the one hand, the U.S. has the largest and 
oldest hedge fund market in the world. Approximately half of the 
world’s hedge funds assets are based in the U.S. alone, as are the 
overwhelming majority of the largest funds which have over U.S.$1 
billion in assets2. On the other hand, due to U.S. securities regula-
tion, its hedge fund market is also far less accessible to the general 
public than many other jurisdictions. 
U.S. securities law requires investors to be wealthy to legally qualify 
to invest in hedge funds. For individual investors, this means earn-
ing at least U.S.$200,000 in annual income if single (U.S.$300,000 
in annual income if married) or having a net worth of at least U.S.$1 
million. U.S. law also prohibits hedge funds from making any com-
munications with the public, even if they otherwise do not sell their 
securities to retail investors. According to a 2007 U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) estimate, wealth-based qualifica-
tions permit only 8.5 percent of U.S. households to invest in hedge 
funds3.
In contrast to the U.S., several regulatory regimes governing well-
developed financial markets permit retail investors to have far 
greater access to hedge funds than their counterparts in the U.S. 
In Australia, hedge funds that register with the government and 
make basic disclosures are permitted to market and sell securi-
ties to retail investors without any restrictions on their invest-
ment activities4. Irish law recognizes a category of funds that may 
invest in hedge funds and are accessible to retail investors without 
restriction5. Spain and Switzerland have also established regula-
tory frameworks for retail investors to access hedge funds directly 
or through funds of hedge funds, as have Japan and Singapore6. 
Hong Kong permits retail investors to purchase the shares of 
hedge funds and funds of hedge funds with investments as small 
as U.S.$50,000 and U.S.$10,000, respectively7. The U.K.’s Financial 
Services Authority is also currently considering regulatory reforms 
to allow retail investors greater access to hedge funds. Under U.S. 
law, however, selling shares to retail investors would prohibit a fund 
from charging a performance-based fee and substantially restrict 
the fund’s ability to utilize alternative investment strategies — two 
of the defining features of hedge funds.
Wealth-based qualifications in the U.S. are meant to advance 
investor protection. From the point of view of the SEC, limiting 
the class of investors able to invest in hedge funds makes it likely 
that those who invest in the funds possess a sufficient degree of 
financial sophistication to make informed investment choices, are 
able to hire the services of those with enough sophistication, or at 
least have the ability to bear substantial investment risk. Although 
wealth-based qualifications may prevent some unsophisticated 
investors from making uninformed hedge fund investments, several 
facts about the nature of modern financial markets suggest that 
SEC policy toward hedge funds generally undermines the interests 
of U.S. retail investors. Today, U.S. investors are able to invest in a 
vast and growing array of investments, such as mutual funds that 
employ hedge fund-like strategies and synthetic exchange-traded 
funds that track the performance of niche market sectors. These 
investment products possess comparable risk and disclosure char-
acteristics to hedge funds even though they are subject to the full 
U.S. securities law regime. 
In addition, retail investors that have an interest in hedge funds likely 
have, either alone or with the assistance of a financial adviser, enough 
financial sophistication to make investment decisions that reduce the 
overall risk of their portfolios. Unsophisticated retail investors, by 
contrast, would likely have no desire to invest in vehicles with which 
they have little familiarity. In any case, the companies and products 
unsophisticated retail investors are permitted to invest in are not 
uniformly safer or less prone to fraud, easier to understand, or even 
more meaningfully transparent than hedge funds.
The SEC is mandated by law to advance investor protection. 
Investor protection entails protecting investors from economic 
losses stemming from fraud and more subtle forms of opportunism 
by issuers, traders, and other market participants. However, a secu-
rities regime does not fully protect investors from losses merely by 
promoting informed investment decision-making through manda-
tory disclosure and prohibiting fraud, manipulation, and other types 
of malfeasance. Investor protection also requires that investors be 
permitted to invest in a wide range of securities to diversify the 
risks to their portfolios. Today, due to the explosive growth and 
integration of global financial markets and rapid financial innova-
tion, even a conservative portfolio of stocks and bonds cannot 
escape losses stemming from fluctuations in the global capital mar-
kets. Investor protection policy must recognize the interconnected-
ness of the financial markets, since investment losses stemming 
from investment risk are no less destructive to investor wealth than 
losses stemming from malfeasance. 
Historically, hedge funds have been able to reduce and even 
eliminate investor losses entirely during general market downturns. 
Because hedge funds are uniquely able to diversify a portfolio from 
market risks, the funds not only advance the same goal sought by 
investor protection regulation, but do so in a way other investment 
products cannot. Limiting hedge funds only to the wealthy prevents 
financially sophisticated yet nonwealthy investors from using the 
funds to minimize losses and maximize the risk-adjusted returns 
of their investment portfolios. Such a limitation may deprive non-
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wealthy investors from having the same opportunities as wealthy 
investors to save their income and accumulate wealth over time. 
Prohibiting hedge funds from selling shares to retail investors is 
thus an artifact of the U.S. securities regime long rendered obsolete 
by financial innovation and the maturation of the global investment 
marketplace. This article proposes reforms to update U.S. law by 
permitting retail investors to have greater access to hedge funds. 
Hedge funds and the retail sector
‘Hedge fund’ is a label that applies to a very diverse group of 
investment funds, not all of which technically hedge their invest-
ments. Although there is no definition of hedge fund under U.S. 
securities law, a hedge fund is widely understood to be a type of 
private investment pool not subject to the full range of restrictions 
on investment activities and disclosure obligations imposed by the 
federal securities laws. Hedge funds typically make very frequent 
trades in securities and financial derivatives, although a significant 
portion make relatively long-term investments and may do so in 
investments other than financial instruments. Hedge funds charge 
a performance-based fee to investors in addition to a fee based 
upon assets under management. What distinguishes hedge funds 
from other types of private investment funds is that hedge funds 
calculate and allocate performance fees to managers on an annual 
or quarterly basis, even if no investments have been traded (and 
gains or losses realized). 
Performance fees are typically structured with high-water marks, 
which require that managers first recover any prior losses before 
a performance allocation can be made. Hedge funds also limit the 
ability of investors to withdraw capital to a periodic basis (i.e., only 
at the end of the month or quarter), prohibit investors from trans-
ferring shares, and typically institute a lock-up which allows the 
fund to hold initial capital contributions for a period ranging from 
one quarter to two years. Hedge fund managers also often invest 
a substantial portion of their own net worth into the funds they 
advise, not only to benefit from investment gains, but also to align 
their incentives with and signal quality to investors. In addition to 
buying securities to be later sold at a higher price, hedge funds also 
typically employ investment strategies comprised of trading deriva-
tives, short selling, and using leverage.
As the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to a close, 
the hedge fund industry displays characteristics typical of a rapidly 
maturing entrepreneurial sector of the economy. Rapid growth in 
assets under management and number of funds is perhaps the 
most noticeable trend in the industry. From 1999 to 2004, the 
global hedge fund industry nearly doubled in size, growing from 
an estimated U.S.$456 billion in assets under management to 
U.S.$973 billion, with the number of funds also approximately dou-
bling to 7,436 from 3,6178. By the end of the first quarter of 2008, 
the hedge fund industry was comprised of approximately U.S.$2.8 
trillion in assets managed across an estimated 15,250 separate 
single-manager funds9.
Along with the rapid influx of managers and funds has come a 
decrease in superior risk-adjusted returns, or alpha, reflecting the 
inherent scarcity of arbitrage opportunities and the widespread 
diffusion of hedge fund investment strategies. Financial institutions 
are also playing an increasingly significant, if not wholly dominant, 
role in the industry. Earlier years were characterized by stand-
alone (or boutique) investment funds providing services to high net 
worth individuals. Today, large investment banks such as Goldman 
Sachs and J.P. Morgan routinely sponsor and manage hedge funds, 
and provide prime brokerage services to a significant share of the 
industry. Large institutional investors are also increasingly becom-
ing the funds’ dominant investor base. Along with institutionaliza-
tion is increasing sophistication, as hedge funds and their special-
ized third-party service providers continue to adopt increasingly 
standardized operating procedures, employ more sophisticated 
controls, and increase resources committed to risk personnel, oper-
ations, and external monitoring10. Nonetheless, hedge funds, like 
other financial institutions, still face significant challenges such as 
valuing illiquid assets and mitigating the operational risks of over-
the-counter derivatives trading.
Outside of the U.S., a niche market is growing within the hedge 
fund sector to provide services to retail investors. In Australia, for 
example, high net worth and retail investors together account for 
approximately two-thirds of the hedge fund market investor base11. 
Other jurisdictions that permit retail access to hedge funds are likely 
to see greater participation as demand for alternative investment 
products by retail investors seems to be growing. Nonetheless, even 
in the absence of regulation, not all hedge funds would seek retail 
investor clientele. In some non-U.S. jurisdictions, retail investment 
funds that invest in hedge funds have emerged as the most com-
mercially feasible structure for retail investors to have access to 
hedge funds.
The U.s. hedge fund legal regime
U.S. hedge funds are primarily governed by the business entity law 
of the state or off-shore jurisdiction in which they are organized, 
the law of contract as is applicable to their internal operating 
agreement and relationships with investors and counterparties, 
and federal securities law which is promulgated and enforced at 
the national level. U.S.-based hedge funds are typically organized 
as limited partnerships or limited liability companies. This structure 
minimizes the tax liability of the manager and the fund and gives 
the manager wide-ranging flexibility in managing the fund’s internal 
affairs and carrying out its investment strategy. 
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Federal law applicable to issuers and investment funds creates a 
two-tiered structure within which retail investors have virtually 
no access to hedge funds. U.S. securities laws and regulations do 
not directly limit investors in their ability to invest in hedge funds. 
However, hedge funds typically find it essential to their business 
model to operate without being subject to the full scope of federal 
regulation that would restrict their investment strategies, impose 
costly mandatory disclosure requirements, and prohibit their ability 
to charge a performance fee. To qualify for exemptions from cer-
tain federal laws, investment funds must limit their investor base to 
wealthy individuals and institutions. Accordingly, the choices hedge 
funds make in response to regulation keep retail investors out of 
the market.
Four major federal securities laws are applicable to investment 
funds, and an archetypal hedge fund operates to gain partial exemp-
tion from at least three of them by, among other things, not selling 
its securities to retail investors. The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities 
Act) governs the conduct of companies raising capital in the U.S. 
capital markets12. It requires issuers of securities to register with the 
SEC and file a registration statement containing information such as 
a description of the issuer’s business and the risks associated with 
purchasing its securities. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act) mandates registration and periodic disclosure from 
issuers (i.e., annual and quarterly reports) whose securities trade in 
a secondary market on a national exchange13. 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act) 
applies to issuers in the business of investing or trading securities. 
The Investment Company Act imposes extensive and detailed dis-
closure requirements on registered investment companies, requires 
a board comprised of at least 40 percent independent directors, 
and limits investment companies’ ability to utilize leverage, short 
sales, and derivatives. Hedge fund investment strategies are often 
centered around the efficient utilization of such techniques. Finally, 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) requires that 
registered investment fund managers disclose information about 
their general investment strategy, potential conflicts of interest, 
personnel background, and any financial or legal issue that may 
prevent the adviser from meeting its contractual commitments to 
clients. The Advisers Act also generally prohibits registered invest-
ment advisers from charging a performance fee to clients. 
Hedge funds are exempt from the registration and disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Act because they do not offer their 
securities to the public. Rather, hedge funds must make a private 
placement of securities to select financially sophisticated inves-
tors without using any form of widespread advertising or solicita-
tion, and must take steps to prevent resales of their securities. To 
ensure that the securities offering falls within the scope of a private 
placement, hedge funds typically limit their securities to accredited 
investors, which, in the case of individual investors, are defined by 
law to include only large institutions and individuals earning at least 
U.S.$200,000 in annual income if single (U.S.$300,000 in joint 
income if married) or having a net worth of at least U.S.$1 million14. 
Hedge funds gain exemption from the reporting requirements of 
the Exchange Act in part by limiting the number of investors in each 
fund to less than 500 persons. 
To be exempt from the Investment Company Act, hedge funds can 
either limit the number of investors in the fund to one hundred, or 
only allow investors meeting the definition of a qualified purchaser to 
invest in the fund, which in the case of individuals means the investor 
must own at least U.S.$5 million in investments15. Finally, hedge fund 
managers seeking exemption from the Advisers Act must qualify as 
a private adviser, meaning that the manager does not advise more 
than 15 funds, does not hold itself out to the public, and does not 
advise a registered investment company16. Despite the general pro-
hibition, a registered adviser may nonetheless charge a performance 
fee if providing services to a fund excluded from the definition of 
investment company because each investor is a qualified purchaser, 
or if all investors in the fund meet the definition of qualified client, 
which includes individuals having at least U.S.$1.5 million in net worth 
or at least U.S.$750,000 managed by the adviser17. 
Despite being exempt from substantial portions of the federal 
securities law, hedge funds are still subject to pervasive federal 
regulation. Hedge funds are subject to the antifraud provisions of 
the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Even unregistered investment 
advisers are prohibited from making false or misleading statements 
regarding their investment strategies, experience, credentials, 
risks associated with the fund, and valuation of the fund’s assets18. 
In addition, hedge funds must disclose significant positions in 
public company stock. For example, to prevent insider trading the 
Exchange Act requires hedge funds to make a disclosure when 
owning 10 or more percent of a company’s publicly traded equity 
securities. To increase information about the investment activities 
of institutional shareholders, the Exchange Act also requires hedge 
funds to make a quarterly disclosure of all of their equity holdings 
if the fund owns more than U.S.$100 million in stock traded on a 
national exchange or on the NASDAQ19. In addition, hedge funds 
that actively trade certain derivatives may be subject to regulation 
by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, and those man-
aging certain types of pension fund assets may be subject to the 
strictures of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.
The rationale for wealth-based qualifications
Qualification for the foregoing exemptions depend in large part on a 
hedge fund selling securities only to wealthy investors who, in case 
of individuals, must at a minimum meet the definition of an accred-
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ited investor under the Securities Act. The rationale behind limiting 
hedge funds to wealthy investors stems from a fundamental purpose 
of U.S. securities law, which is to protect investors from being taken 
advantage of by unscrupulous issuers of securities. These exemp-
tions are based on the premise that being wealthy is an indicator of 
financial sophistication or otherwise having the ability to bear the 
type of risks associated with hedge funds. In 2007, the SEC proposed 
to increase the wealth required to invest in private investment funds 
to U.S.$2.5 million in investable assets. The SEC explained that sub-
stantial wealth hurdles to invest in hedge funds provide an objective 
and clear standard to use in ascertaining whether a purchaser of 
a private investment vehicle’s securities is likely to have sufficient 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to 
enable them to evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective invest-
ment, or to hire someone who can20.
The SEC thus considers wealthy investors able to make informed 
choices about hedge funds because even if they do not possess 
sufficient financial acumen they are able to purchase the services 
of persons with financial sophistication, or at least bear losses from 
poor investment choices. This approach, however, fails to take into 
account the nature of the modern investment marketplace and the 
disclosures typically made by hedge funds. 
investment opportunities available to U.s. retail 
investors
Today, U.S. retail investors can invest in far more than stocks, 
bonds, real estate, money-market instruments, and other tradition-
al investments. Discount online brokerages allow retail investors to 
engage in their own trading strategies involving options, futures, 
and short sales with relatively little upfront capital and without the 
need to consult a specialized broker. E*Trade Financial, one of the 
most widely-utilized discount brokerages by American investors, 
also enables investors through its foreign affiliates to invest in the 
stock of foreign companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, and Euronext Paris21. This includes the shares 
of publicly listed hedge funds and funds of hedge funds on foreign 
exchanges.
In addition, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), which are passively man-
aged investment vehicles that track a basket of securities or a price 
index, provide retail investors with complex investment opportuni-
ties in niche market sectors. For example, Proshares offers investors 
effectively leveraged Ultra ETFs that double the daily performance 
of general market indices and Short ETFs whose performance is the 
opposite of a market index such as the Dow Jones Industrial Index 
and the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. Several issuers offer ETFs 
that track the value of commodities such as gold, silver, and oil, 
while some other ETFs track the performance of non-U.S. market 
sectors such as global healthcare providers, Brazilian stocks, and 
the bonds issued by emerging market governments. 
Perhaps most importantly, innovations in financial products are 
increasingly presenting U.S. retail investors with new hedge fund-
like investments. One development is the growth of hedged mutual 
funds, which are publicly registered investment companies that 
mimic hedge fund strategies and only require an average minimum 
investment of U.S.$5,000, with some as low as U.S.$50022. A popu-
lar type of hedged mutual fund is a 130/30 fund, which invests 30 
percent of its net assets in short positions and uses the proceeds 
to purchase an additional 30 percent long, thereby resulting in 
130 percent long allocation and 30 percent short allocation23. 
Other recent hedge fund-like retail investment products include 
publicly listed hedge funds or alternative asset managers, such as 
Fortress Investment Group, Och-Ziff Capital Management Group, 
and Blackstone Group, all of which went public in the U.S. in 200724. 
Additionally, there are synthetic hedge fund ‘clones’ or replicators, 
which are index-based funds that attempt to replicate hedge fund 
returns through complex, quantitative trading algorithms25. For 
example, the Goldman Sachs Absolute Return Tracker Fund is open 
to retail investors and seeks to replicate hedge fund market expo-
sures based upon a proprietary Goldman Sachs hedge fund returns 
index26. ETFs that mimic hedge funds and are accessible to retail 
investors may also soon be available. For example, Stonebrook 
Capital is planning to launch an ETF in 2009 that seeks to replicate 
the returns of a global hedge funds index27.
All of these investment products are available without restriction to 
U.S. retail investors. Yet, from the perspective of finance, they pos-
sess a level of investment risk, complexity, and transparency that is 
comparable to that of hedge funds. For example, Proshares’ Ultra 
ETFs and short ETFs achieve their stated investment objectives by 
employing futures, options, swaps, forwards, and other complex 
financial instruments. However, the ETFs are not required by law 
to make specific disclosures about how these financial instruments 
are specifically utilized, and instead make general disclosures about 
their mathematical investment methodology, the definitions of such 
instruments, and the numerous types of risk factors involved28.
Indeed, because hedge fund-like products pursue alternative invest-
ment strategies, they possess the very same risk characteristics 
and complexities as genuine hedge funds29. Retail investors can also 
use at-home trading platforms in conjunction with access to deriva-
tives and short-sales to pursue any manner of investment strategy 
on their own, including those employed by hedge funds. Moreover, 
even investing in U.S. publicly traded companies is complicated 
by the business operations of companies in a global and informa-
tion-based economy. For example, the value of securities issued 
by bulge-bracket banking and financial services conglomerates is 
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a function of their multiple business divisions and a wide-variety 
of risks and developments including inflation, foreign exchange 
fluctuations, patent acquisitions, the companies’ utilization of 
derivatives and special purpose entities, and legal, accounting, and 
regulatory developments. 
While the disclosures made by complex operating companies, ETFs, 
and hedge fund-like products provide useful information to inves-
tors, any system of mandatory disclosure is inherently limited in 
its ability to provide retail investors with easily understandable 
information about the complex factors upon which the value of 
such companies’ shares truly depend. No system of disclosure can 
prevent retail investors from having to confront substantial, if not 
overwhelming, complexity in making investment decisions.
Hedge fund disclosures
While investment products open to U.S. retail investors have com-
parable, if not the exact same, risks and complexities to hedge 
funds, they share much of the disclosure practices of SEC-regis-
tered issuers. Hedge funds make substantial and comprehensive 
disclosures to comply with the laws they are subject to, comport 
with industry norms, and satisfy investors. The antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws serve as a form of implied 
disclosure rule. Because these laws prohibit omissions and 
misleading statements (in addition to false statements), when a 
fund makes any disclosures it must make additional disclosures 
to ensure no statements are later deemed misleading by a court 
of law or enforcement authorities30. In addition, although hedge 
funds are not required to make all of the same disclosures that are 
necessary for an SEC registration statement, to gain exemption 
under the Securities Act the funds must nonetheless disclose the 
same general type of information. 
Accordingly, in practice, hedge funds typically give potential inves-
tors a private placement memorandum which describes the fund, 
its investment objectives, risk factors, its governance structure, and 
how profits and fees are calculated. Hedge fund disclosures may 
even be more extensive and investor-friendly than those made by 
mutual funds, and are certainly far more extensive than the small, 
closely held companies trading on the Pink OTC Markets, which are 
available to U.S. retail investors but are not required to make peri-
odic or audited financial statements31. 
In response to the demands of institutional investors, hedge funds 
are increasingly disclosing information about their investment 
strategies and operational and risk-management practices. Third 
parties such as Morningstar are also providing transparency by 
making information about hedge funds widely accessible and rat-
ing their performance. In addition, to the extent the hedge fund 
market becomes more crowded and returns become more evenly 
spread throughout the industry, at least some funds are likely to 
improve their disclosure practices to distinguish themselves from 
competitors. Indeed, a survey of alternative asset managers found 
that hedge funds make more frequent disclosures to investors than 
private equity, real estate, and all other types of surveyed funds32.
Information disclosed by hedge funds and other parties is therefore 
sufficient for U.S. retail investors to make informed investment 
decisions, at least when compared to the multitudes of other invest-
ment opportunities available to them. While not all retail investors 
posses the requisite financial acumen to make informed invest-
ment choices about hedge funds or other opportunities currently 
available to them, those that take the steps necessary to invest in 
the funds will likely possess the requisite financial sophistication or 
hire a third party to assist them in decision making. Unsophisticated 
retail investors are highly unlikely to invest in hedge funds. 
Research finds that retail investors are typically risk averse, fail to 
properly diversify their portfolios, and are biased towards investing 
in companies they are familiar with, even when doing so under-
mines their economic interests33. 
Increased access to hedge funds is thus highly unlikely to induce 
unsophisticated retail investors to invest in funds they know little 
about given that they currently fail to utilize the vast array of 
widely publicized and low-cost opportunities (i.e., mutual funds, 
ETFs) already open to them. Retail hedge funds operated by major 
financial institutions have little incentive to market or sell their 
shares with promises of exorbitant returns merely to appeal to 
uninformed investors. Indeed, one result of the credit crisis that 
began in 2007 is that hedge fund managers will likely make more 
conservative performance predictions to investors, as even opti-
mistic communications about the general state of the economy may 
now be grounds for fraud liability. 
The benefits of investing in hedge funds for retail 
investors
The basic lesson of modern portfolio economics is that diversifying 
the risks to which one is exposed will help to maximize an investor’s 
risk-adjusted returns. Hedge funds tend to be exposed to risks dif-
ferent than those to which traditional investments are exposed, 
including the risks associated with exposure to overall market fluc-
tuations. This means that investing in hedge funds has the potential 
to help diversify a portfolio and make retail investors better off. 
Compared to equity returns, hedge funds’ relatively low correla-
tion with fluctuations in the overall market means that the funds 
can produce absolute returns — gains even while equity returns are 
negative. From 1994 to 2007, the CSFB hedge fund index indicates 
that hedge fund returns closely tracked those of the S&P 500 
equity index, but did so with far less volatility and correlation with 
overall market fluctuations34.
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Hedge funds’ relatively low correlation with the overall market has 
thus far remained in tact during the subprime mortgage-initiated 
credit crisis that began in 2007. Losses from sub-prime-backed 
securities began to spread to the financial markets generally after 
the U.S. securities firm Bear Stearns announced on June 22, 2007 
that it had bailed out two of its own hedge funds due to losses from 
investments in such securities. During what may be considered 
approximately the first year of the credit crunch, from June 1, 2007 
through May 30, 2008, the U.S. stock market lost 8.27 percent of 
its value while hedge funds globally produced gains estimated from 
1.83 percent to 4.97 percent, depending on which hedge fund data-
set is used and whether a composite index or a diversified funds of 
hedge funds strategy is considered to be the more truly representa-
tive measure of the funds’ returns35. 
However, directly comparing hedge fund return figures with those 
of equities obscures some important differences between them. 
Hedge funds, for example, may not allow investors to withdraw 
their capital when desired whereas stock investments can be exited 
daily in the secondary markets. Furthermore, hedge funds have risk 
properties that may cause individual funds to have more extreme 
negative returns than stock or bond investments36. Nonetheless, 
the overall performance of hedge funds since 1994, and especially 
during the bursting of the Internet bubble and the credit crisis 
thus far, strongly suggests that retail investors could benefit from 
allocating some portion of their portfolio to these funds. Indeed, 
numerous academic studies find that hedge funds can improve the 
performance of a more traditional stock and bond portfolio37.
In addition, hedge fund-like investments currently available to retail 
investors have yet to provide a true alternative to genuine hedge 
funds. Since going public in 2007, the share prices of U.S. publicly 
listed alternative asset managers have all produced losses (despite 
the profitability of their underlying funds). Furthermore, while 
hedge fund clones may be able to outperform some hedge funds, 
thus far they have been unable to outperform hedge funds gener-
ally38. And while hedged mutual funds may outperform traditional 
mutual funds, they have generally been unable to match the perfor-
mance of hedge funds39. For instance, in the same twelve months 
leading up to May 2008 analyzed above, a report by EurekaHedge 
found that long/short equity hedge funds gained 5.62 percent while 
130/30 hedged mutual funds lost 2.26 percent40.
reforms to create a U.s. retail hedge fund market
U.S. financial regulators generally support the policy of imposing 
wealth-based qualifications to invest in hedge funds. Indeed, in 2007 
the SEC attempted to increase the minimum net worth required to 
invest in hedge funds to U.S.$2.5 million through a rulemaking pro-
cedure that was, ultimately, never finalized41. Nonetheless, voices 
at the SEC have at times expressed a desire to increase hedge 
fund access to retail investors. For example, in testimony on May 
22, 2003 before the House Committee on Financial Services, then 
Chairman William H. Donaldson noted that “there is a definite need 
to examine how hedge funds, properly run and properly disclosed, 
can be allowed to be purchased by retail investors.” Based upon 
the examination in this article, there are several types of regulatory 
reforms that would enable retail investors to have access to and 
benefit from hedge funds.
The most straightforward approach would be to permit U.S. inves-
tors to have direct access to hedge funds. This would entail sub-
stantially reducing or eliminating the wealth-based qualifications 
required for funds to participate in various securities-related activi-
ties. In particular, it would entail substantially reducing the amount 
of wealth required to meet the definition of accredited investor 
under the Securities Act so that retail investors could purchase the 
securities of hedge funds in a private offering. Similarly, it would 
require substantially reducing the amount of wealth required to 
meet the definition of qualified purchaser under the Investment 
Company Act so that retail investors could invest in a private fund. 
Finally, it would also entail substantially reducing the amount of 
wealth required to meet the definition of a qualified client under the 
Advisers Act so that registered advisers could charge performance 
fees to a fund with retail clientele. 
In addition, to enable retail hedge funds to be sufficiently capital-
ized through raising relatively smaller allocations of funds from 
retail investors, the 500-investor limitation for companies to be 
exempt from the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act 
would also have to be removed or at least dramatically increased. 
Following the policy of other jurisdictions, the SEC could also enact 
a compromise reform by removing the wealth-based qualifications 
for investors in hedge funds that are managed by a government-
registered investment adviser.
Another general approach is to allow retail investors greater 
access to hedge fund investment strategies through a registered 
investment company. This approach was suggested in a 2003 SEC 
staff report which concluded that retail investors may benefit if 
registered investment companies were less restricted by regula-
tion from pursuing hedge fund-like investment strategies42. There 
are two basic types of public investment companies. The first is an 
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open-end investment company that sells daily-redeemable shares 
to investors that do not trade on secondary markets. These compa-
nies are often referred to as mutual funds and, in the U.S., comprise 
over 95 percent of the assets involved with registered investment 
companies. Another type of registered investment company is a 
closed-end fund. Closed-end funds offer a fixed number of shares 
that, unlike mutual funds, trade in secondary markets and are only 
redeemable at specified time periods.
However, the Investment Company Act limits all registered invest-
ment companies from pursuing the full range of investment strate-
gies utilized by hedge funds involving leverage, short sales, and 
derivatives trading. To use leverage in the form of borrowing bank 
funds, a registered investment company must cover the debt by 
retaining assets equivalent to at least 300 percent of the borrow-
ings43. Registered investment companies must also offset any short 
position and certain derivatives positions by a corresponding long 
position or by holding liquid securities of an equivalent value in 
a segregated account.44 Mutual funds in particular are prohibited 
from employing lock-ups or other investor liquidity-constraining 
devices. In addition, mutual funds typically adopt relatively narrow 
long-only investment strategies and lack the flexibility to quickly 
adapt to changing market conditions because deviating from 
an investment policy deemed fundamental requires shareholder 
approval. Each of these limitations on investment companies’ 
activities would need to be substantially reduced or eliminated to 
permit them to offer investors the full range of benefits associated 
with hedge fund investing.
A third approach to increasing retail investors’ access to hedge 
funds would be to enact reforms that would afford retail investors 
the opportunity to invest in a public investment company that in 
turn invests in underlying hedge funds. In jurisdictions where retail 
investors have access to hedge funds, it is often through invest-
ing in such funds of hedge funds. Besides offering investors the 
benefits of professional management and diversification of hedge 
fund investments, funds of hedge funds may also be more attrac-
tive from the perspective of hedge fund providers. Hedge funds 
often find that the optimal investment contributions required, from 
the perspective of managing a fund, are typically larger than retail 
investors are able to afford, and would therefore not seek out retail 
investors even if no regulatory consequences were present. A fund 
of hedge funds can overcome this limitation by pooling together 
smaller contributions from retail investors. 
However, because the Investment Company Act prohibits mutual 
funds from investing greater than 15 percent of the net value of 
their assets in illiquid securities, which includes those typically 
issued by hedge funds45, removing this limitation would be required 
for mutual funds to become the appropriate vehicle for a retail fund 
of hedge funds. A closed-end fund, on the other hand, has no limi-
tations regarding holding illiquid assets and may therefore be the 
more appropriate vehicle for establishing a fund of hedge funds for 
retail investors. Unlike a mutual fund, however, a closed-end fund 
of hedge funds would likely limit investors’ ability to redeem shares 
as do genuine hedge funds.
conclusion
Although the U.S. securities law and enforcement regime is rightly 
considered among the highest quality in the world, SEC regulation 
of hedge funds is increasingly falling behind that of other juris-
dictions with respect to retail investor access. Wealth-based 
qualifications do not protect retail investors from bearing the 
risks associated with hedge funds and do not prevent retail inves-
tors from investing in a wide range of investments that may be 
too complicated for their level of financial sophistication. Rather, 
wealth-based qualifications deprive retail investors of access to the 
full range of investment products and talents of financial market 
practitioners and likely have the effect of increasing the risk of 
retail investors’ portfolios.
Although several non-U.S. jurisdictions have embraced the inevitabil-
ity of an ever-widening and complex array of investment products 
entering the marketplace, U.S. national regulators have yet to update 
the U.S. regulatory framework to permit retail investors to invest in 
hedge funds alongside numerous other comparable investment prod-
ucts. Although investor protection concerns may explain the reluc-
tance of the SEC to ease access to hedge funds, the funds’ historical 
performance relative to that of regulated investment companies and 
other regulated issuers suggests that failing to permit greater access 
actually undermines investors’ economic welfare — the very goal that 
investor protection regulation seeks to advance.
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